Model Context Protocol (MCP): Landscape, Security Threats, and Future Research Directions

Author: Junming Liu

Update: April 29, 2025

Paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/2503.23278

Code:

#2025 #MCP #pub-arxiv

Model Context Protocol (MCP): Landscape, Security Threats, and Future Research Directions

对MCP的架构及现有应用情况进行介绍，并分析其潜在安全问题，指出未来研究方向。

Background

Limitation of current AI tools

  • Manual API Wiring: required custom authentication, data transformation, and error handling for every integration
  • Standardized Plugin Interfaces: (1) one-directional and could not maintain state or coordinate multiple steps in a task, (2) platform-specific
  • AI Agent Tool Integration (e.g., LangChain):  largely manual, requiring custom implementations
  • Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): limited to passive retrieval of information, cannot update data or trigger workflows.

MCP Architecture

Core Components

  • MCP Hosts: AI application that provides the environment for executing AI-based tasks while running the MCP client.

  • MCP Client:

    • processes notifications from MCP servers
    • performs sampling to gather data

  • MCP Server: managing external tools, sources, and prompts

    • Tools: Enabling external operations
    • Resources: Exposing data to AI models
    • Prompts: Reusable templates for workflow optimization

  • Transfer Layer

    • initial request: query the server’s functionalities
    • initial response: listing the available tools, resources, and prompts
    • exchange of notifications

MCP Server Lifecycle & Security Threats

Creation Phase

  • Name Collision

    • malicious server can register a similar name to legitimate server
    • %% 恶意实体通过注册与合法MCP Server相似或相同的名称，欺骗用户安装恶意Server。 %%

  • Installer Spoofing

    • unofficial auto-installers install unverified malware
    • %% 来自非官方渠道的自动安装工具可能会安装未经验证的软件包 %%

  • Code Injection / Backdoor

    • malicious code embedded into the MCP server’s codebase

Operation Phase

  • Tool Name Conflicts

    • malicious tool can register a similar name to legitimate tool

  • Slash Command Overlap

    • multiple tools can register similar commands (e.g., /delete: A. remove temporary, B. erase critical system logs)

  • Sandbox Escape

    • break out of the restricted environment and gain unauthorized access to the host system

Update Phase

  • Post-Update Privilege Persistence

    • outdated privileges remain active after an MCP server update (e.g., API key)

  • Re-deployment of Vulnerable Versions

  • Configuration Drift

    • manual adjustments, overlooked updates, or conflicting modifications made
    • unintended changes accumulate in the system configuration

MCP Current Landscape

Future Directions

Challenges

  • Lack of centralized security oversight
  • Authentication and authorization gaps
  • Insufficient debugging and monitoring mechanisms
  • Maintaining consistency in multi-step, cross-system workflows
  • Scalability challenges in multi-tenant environments: consistent performance, security, and tenant isolation
  • Challenges in embedding MCP in smart environments: real-time responsiveness, interoperability, and security

Suggestions

  • MCP maintainers

    • establish a formal package management system
    • centralized server registry
    • implementing a secure sandboxing framework

  • developers

    • adhering to secure coding practices and maintaining thorough documentation
    • automate configuration management to mitigate configuration drift

  • researchers

    • version control and package management in decentralized ecosystems
    • sandbox security, mitigate privilege persistence, prevent configuration drift
    • context-aware agent orchestration in multi-tool environments %% ensuring state consistency and preventing tool invocation conflicts %%

  • end-users

    • using verified MCP servers
    • regularly updating MCP servers and monitoring configuration changes